The US-Saudi nuclear deal: a reaction to the Iran War

The United States and Saudi Arabia announced this week they have signed a Bilateral Safeguards Agreement that will allow the Gulf kingdom to develop a civilian nuclear program. The agreement will now be sent to the US Congress for review. Although some lawmakers from both Republican and Democrat parties are expected to oppose the deal, President Trump's Republican Party controls both chambers of Congress, making it unlikely that opponents will have enough votes to block it.

The full text of the agreement has not been made public. However, officials from both countries indicate that it could allow Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium on its own soil to produce fuel at a US-built enrichment facility, rather than relying on imported fuel. Saudi Arabia aims to use nuclear power for some electricity generation, thereby boosting oil sales by freeing up more supplies for export. The deal would make American companies central in the development of the country’s nuclear infrastructure, while denying competitors like China and Russia a foothold in the country.

If confirmed, this would distinguish the agreement from the 2009 US-UAE nuclear deal, under which the United Arab Emirates agreed not to enrich uranium domestically and accepted a number of additional non-proliferation restrictions. The project could be worth billions of dollars to the United States, with American companies potentially building and operating key elements of Saudi Arabia's nuclear infrastructure.

The agreement follows the restart of the armed conflict between Washington and Tehran over Iran's nuclear program. However, the deal was first brokered in November 2025, after the Saudi crown prince's visit to Washington as negotiations between the United States and Iran crashed. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, a long-standing US ally, hosts several American military bases that have already been targeted by Iranian attacks, while Iran's allies in Yemen, the Houthis, recently announced a "maritime blockade" against the kingdom.

Iran's pursuit of weapons-capable nuclear material has been one of the principal justifications cited by the United States and Israel for military action against Tehran. However, if the conflict fails to produce a decisive strategic victory or permanently eliminate Iran's nuclear capabilities, the Trump administration could present the Saudi nuclear agreement as an alternative means of reinforcing US influence in the region. By enabling Saudi Arabia to develop advanced nuclear capabilities, Washington could seek to establish a new balance of power in the Middle East, using a stronger Saudi deterrent to counter Iran even if Tehran's nuclear ambitions cannot be fully eliminated.

President Trump has also stated that the agreement will ultimately be contingent on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords, the normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab states brokered during his first term. Riyadh, however, has repeatedly maintained that it will only normalize relations with Israel if there is an "irreversible pathway" toward the creation of a Palestinian state, a condition that the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently rejected.

The agreement remains controversial because domestic uranium enrichment could, in theory, provide Saudi Arabia with the technical capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman acknowledged this possibility in 2018, declaring that while Saudi Arabia did not intend to acquire nuclear weapons, "without a doubt if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible."

Israel officially has always opposed Saudi Arabia to have nuclear weapons, but its Economy Minister Nir Barkat said recently that Israel "can manage it" if Saudi Arabia develops nuclear power exclusively for peaceful purposes, which can be interpreted as m nuclear weapons for defensive purposes in case Iran develops its own and Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords.

Israel itself is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, although it has maintained a longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying their existence.

From a realist perspective in international relations, the spread of nuclear weapons among rival regional powers can, under certain conditions, contribute to strategic stability through deterrence. When adversaries possess comparable retaliatory capabilities, the costs of war become so catastrophic that both sides are discouraged from initiating conflict.

Applied to the Middle East, this logic suggests that if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon, enabling Saudi Arabia to develop a comparable deterrent could help restore a regional balance of power. Rather than relying solely on US military guarantees, a Saudi nuclear capability could increase the costs of aggression for Tehran and reduce the likelihood of coercion or large-scale war through mutual deterrence. This view remains contested, however, as critics argue that additional nuclear powers also increase the risks of proliferation, miscalculation, and accidental escalation.