Cuba’s near collapse amid Trump’s oil blockade

The US has long targeted Cuba through various economic weapons dating from the early 1960s. One of the most important was the Helms-Burton Act that not only prohibited U.S. companies from doing business with Cuba (except with products considered "humanitarian"), but also punished companies from other countries that did business with Cuba if they wanted to do business with the US.

In his second term, US President Barack Obama eased travel restrictions for Americans visiting Cuba along with some trade policies, but this was short-lived. Trump restored these measures in his first administration and in 2019 the title III of the Helms-Burton Act was activated, which allows in particular for actions by US citizens against alleged beneficiaries of expropriation of US assets during the 1959 revolution. On this basis, US citizens are entitled to sue companies or individuals for compensation that, in the US view, ‘traffic’ in confiscated property. This covers persons and undertakings that, inter alia, sell, transfer, distribute, broker, manage, purchase, lease or possess confiscated property, but also persons and undertakings that engage in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property. The scope of the provision is extremely broad and thus allows for extensive legal action. Damages on this basis may include the current market value of the confiscated property, as well as court and reasonable lawyers’ fees, and may, under certain circumstances, even be tripled.

Since the US enacted Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, many US individuals and companies have filed claims on this basis and brought actions against EU companies such as the Spanish airline Iberia, the Dutch reservations platform Booking, the Spanish hotel group Meliá and the German company Trivago GmbH. According to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, 21 lawsuits have been filed so far, and more are expected to follow. However, some have already been rejected by US courts.

Since early  2026, the Trump administration has formally designated Cuba a national security threat and imposed tariffs on any country that supplies oil to the island unless the Cuban government alters its policies as Venezuela did after the capture of Nicolás Maduro. This measure significantly broadened the scope of US pressure by extending it beyond direct bilateral restrictions to clearly include third-party suppliers. As a result, any country that might export fuel to Cuba now face the risk of financial penalties if they continue shipments. The policy has effectively discouraged external energy support at a time when Cuba is critically dependent on imports.

The impact of these measures has been compounded by the collapse of Venezuela’s oil deliveries. For decades, Venezuela was Cuba’s principal energy partner, supplying between 27,000 and 35,000 barrels per day under long-standing cooperation agreements. These shipments formed the backbone of Cuba’s energy security. However, the capture of Nicolás Maduro has brought those flows to a halt. Mexico, which in 2025 accounted for roughly 25 percent of Cuba’s imported fuel and supplied on average around 37,000 barrels per day, has also sharply reduced deliveries. In early 2026, Cuba received only one significant Mexican shipment , approximately 84,900 barrels, a fraction of previous volumes and far below the island’s daily requirements.

Drivers in Cuba are facing the prospects of waiting several months to refuel their cars, as fuel shortages caused by a US oil siege intensify. To avoid chaos outside gas stations, Cuba's government last week made it obligatory for drivers to use an app known as Ticket to get refueling appointments. The liter of gasoline currently sells for $1.30 at gas stations and can cost up to $6 in the growing black market. Government workers in Cuba earn less than $20 a month. Drivers are only allowed to buy 20 liters of gasoline.

Cuba’s domestic oil production is limited to roughly 40,000 barrels per day, covering only about one third of national demand. The remaining 60,000 barrels per day historically had to be met through imports. When those imports decline sharply, the system cannot compensate internally. Between January and October 2025, total crude and fuel imports fell by 35 percent to approximately 45,400 barrels per day, down from about 69,400 barrels per day the previous year. By 2025, the distribution of Cuba’s fuel imports reflected heavy dependence on a small group of partners: 61 percent from Venezuela, 25 percent from Mexico, 10 percent from Russia and 4 percent from Algeria. By early 2026, many of these flows had been disrupted or ceased altogether.

Cuba’s electricity grid relies heavily on fuel-burning thermoelectric plants and distributed generation engines. When fuel supplies tighten, power generation falls. Rolling blackouts have become routine across the island, with electricity cut for many hours each day in multiple provinces. At times, more than one hundred distributed generation units have reportedly been offline because of lack of fuel or even basic lubricants.

The prices of food and gas have skyrocketed seemingly overnight: a package of chicken now costs a month’s salary, or 20 dollars. Two thirds of the country was without electricity at peak demand last week, and daily electricity cuts averaged more than 20 hours in many provinces.

Satellite analysis has provided visual confirmation of the scale of the disruption. Independent observers have estimated that nighttime illumination in major cities such as Santiago de Cuba and Holguín has fallen by roughly 50 percent compared with typical levels, reflecting the widespread outages. These power shortages affect not only households but also hospitals, water pumping systems, small businesses and industrial facilities. Authorities have been forced into extreme rationing, prioritizing critical infrastructure while suspending or reducing service elsewhere.

The deterioration of public services illustrates how deeply the fuel shortage penetrates everyday life. In Havana, only 44 of the city’s 106 municipal garbage trucks have remained operational due to lack of diesel. Waste has accumulated in neighborhoods, creating visible sanitation problems. Water supply has also been intermittently disrupted because pumping stations in many areas depend on diesel generators. The resulting interruptions increase public health risks, particularly in a tropical climate where standing waste and stagnant water can foster mosquito-borne diseases.

Transportation has nearly collapsed in major urban centers. Public bus routes in Havana have been suspended or drastically reduced because there is simply no fuel to operate them. Commuting to work, school or medical appointments has become difficult or impossible for many residents. Households have reorganized daily routines around electricity availability and limited transport options. Refrigerators and freezers fail during prolonged outages, leading to food spoilage. Clinics struggle to maintain cold storage for medications. Schools and banks adjust operating hours to match intermittent power supply. Even major cultural and commercial events that once attracted international visitors have been postponed or canceled because the infrastructure required to host them cannot be guaranteed.

The aviation sector has been especially hard hit. By early February 2026, Cuba had effectively run out of usable Jet A-1 aviation fuel. Authorities informed international airlines that refueling on the island could no longer be guaranteed. Several foreign carriers suspended inbound flights or limited operations to outbound or repatriation services only. Airlines from the United States, Spain and Latin America have all been affected. Russia organized at least six evacuation flights to return approximately 4,000 of its citizens after regular inbound service became impossible. The inability to refuel aircraft domestically has isolated the island and sharply curtailed passenger traffic.

With flight cancellations, unreliable electricity, and shortages of goods and services, the country’s attractiveness as a tourist destination has diminished. Hotels and resorts are either closed or severely underbooked. The loss of tourism revenue removes one of the government’s primary sources of foreign currency at a time when it is desperately needed to finance imports.

Macroeconomic indicators reinforce the picture of mounting stress. The informal exchange rate for the Cuban peso has depreciated sharply, reaching approximately 500 pesos per U.S. dollar in early 2026, compared with around 400 per dollar in mid-2025. This depreciation reflects declining confidence and scarcity of foreign currency. Although official inflation data for January 2026 showed a year-on-year headline rate of about 13 percent, food and non-alcoholic beverage prices rose far more sharply, highlighting the divergence between headline indicators and lived experience. Inflation in essential goods underscores the combined effect of supply constraints, currency weakness and declining import capacity.

Geopolitically, Cuba’s energy crisis reflects the abrupt unraveling of long-standing supplier relationships. Mexico and Venezuela, once dependable sources of tens of thousands of barrels per day, have reduced exports dramatically. Operational constraints within Venezuela, domestic priorities in Mexico and broader political pressures have converged to constrict flows. The near absence of Venezuelan shipments in early 2026 marks a decisive break from past patterns. Russia has signaled willingness to send fuel labeled as humanitarian aid, but the scale, timing and sustainability of such deliveries remain uncertain.

Since 2021, an estimated two million Cubans have emigrated, significantly reducing the labor force and weakening productive capacity. The departure of younger workers has altered demographic structures and increased pressure on remaining households. With declining public services, reduced employment opportunities and persistent shortages, daily life has become increasingly precarious.

It is unlikely that the US will allow the worldseeing images of starving children in Havana like those we have seen in Sudan. But, for the US government, what happens with Cuba this time is almost personal. Marco Rubio is the son of Cuban immigrants, for whom the fall of Castro’s regime would be the fulfillment of a lifelong dream. In an appearance before the U.S. Congress this January, he asserted that the pressure on the island is not aimed at overthrowing the regime, but added: “We would love to see a regime change.” as for Trump, he stated recently that "It doesn’t have to be a humanitarian crisis. I think they probably would come to us and want to make a deal. I think, you know, we’ll be kind".