The rivalry between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia: what is going on?

Since the UAE gained independence in 1971, Saudi Arabia has often acted like the paternal "big brother" of the Gulf, even initially refusing to recognize the UAE because of old border disputes. Saudi Arabia is currently producing around 11 million barrels per day, the second-largest in the world behind the U.S. and needs oil to stay at roughly $90 a barrel to fund the high-tech cities and "giga-projects" of Vision 2030. Meanwhile, the UAE has spent billions expanding its own capacity to 4.2 million barrels per day and is racing toward a 5 million target for 2027.

After the Arab Spring in 2011, both countries became the ultimate power couple to protect their Sunni monarchies against popular uprisings and Shia groups destabilizing the region. In the previous decade, they were the twin pillars of a conservative-Sunni Gulf order, teaming up to crush uprisings in Bahrain, blockade their neighbor Qatar, and launch a massive military intervention in Yemen in 2015 against the Iran-backed Houthis. For years, it seemed like their alliance was strong, but beneath the surface, the UAE was always pushing for more independence while Saudi Arabia wanted to keep its role as the undisputed regional boss.

The real heart of the drama is that they have two completely different visions for how the Gulf region should develop: Saudi Arabia is acting like the “big brother” who wants everyone to follow the rules, keep borders where they are, and play nice so they can focus on turning Riyadh into the next global business hub for Vision 2030. On the other side, the UAE is playing a much more aggressive, “disruptor” game. They’ve been backing various rebel groups and secessionist movements across the region, from Yemen to Sudan, trying to build a maritime empire by controlling key ports and shipping lanes without having to ask for permission from anyone.

Since 2025, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates has reached a bottom low, and this geopolitical divorce is reshaping the entire Middle East. While they used to team up to fight common enemies like Iran or the Muslim Brotherhood, they’re now actively trying to trip each other up. The vibe shifted from “strong allies” to “deadly rivals,” and the breaking point was when Saudi jets bombed a UAE-linked weapons shipment in Yemen just a few weeks ago.

Things have gotten so tense that even their neighbors are being forced to pick a side. Egypt, for instance, has basically ditched the UAE to get back in Saudi Arabia’s good graces. There are even reports that Egyptian intelligence was spying on Emirati ships and handing those secrets over to the Saudis to help them block UAE moves in Yemen. It’s like a massive game of chess where the pieces are actual countries. Even when it comes to Israel, the two are on different pages; the UAE is leaning into a high-tech alliance with Jerusalem, while Saudi Arabia is playing it cool, refusing to sign any big deals until the Palestinian situation is solved.

Economically, the rivalry is also intensifying: Saudi Arabia is using its massive size to bully companies into moving their headquarters from Dubai to Riyadh, while the UAE is trying to stay ahead by making deals in space, AI, and alternative trade routes. Right now, every war and every reconstruction project in the region, whether it’s in Gaza, Sudan, or Syria, has become a tug-of-war between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It’s no longer just about who has the most oil; it’s about who gets to write the rules for the next century of Arab power.

In Yemen, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has shifted from a quiet disagreement into a dramatic and public confrontation that reached a boiling point in the last weeks. While both countries originally teamed up to fight the Houthi rebels in the North, their partnership was always an “uncomfortable marriage.” The Saudis have consistently backed the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized government, because they want a unified Yemen that can act as a stable neighbor.

The UAE, on the other hand, spent years grooming the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group that wants to bring back an independent South Yemen. The STC and the Houthi movement are rival factions in Yemen's conflict, with the STC seeking secession of the south and the Houthis controlling the north. The STC is UAE-backed and operates within the anti-Houthi bloc, while the Iran-aligned Houthis hold the capital, Sana'a.

The tension finally exploded into open conflict in December 2025 and January 2026. After the STC launched an offensive called “Operation Promising Future” to seize oil-rich regions like Hadramawt and Al-Mahra, Saudi Arabia decided it had seen enough. In an unprecedented move, the Saudis didn’t just use diplomacy; they used their air force to bomb UAE-linked weapons shipments heading to the separatists. This “unprecedented public scolding” signaled that Riyadh now views the UAE’s support for southern secessionists as a direct threat to its own national security.

The situation escalated to the point where Riyadh is actively building a “stabilization” coalition with Turkey and Qatar to counter what it sees as Emirati-backed chaos. By funneling military aid to the Sudanese army and using its diplomatic weight to shut down UAE-supported secessionist dreams in Yemen and Somaliland, Saudi Arabia is trying to prove it’s the only grown-up in the room. Meanwhile, the UAE is doubling down on its “networked” power, betting that its control over the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints and its deep ties with the new Trump administration will make it too important to fail, regardless of how much the “big brother” in Riyadh complains.

This Saudi pushback was incredibly effective and has essentially broken the STC’s momentum. By January 9, 2026, the STC officially announced it was disbanding after losing almost all its territorial gains to Saudi-backed government forces. Their leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, was charged with treason and reportedly fled the country, heading to the UAE via Somaliland. For now, it looks like Saudi Arabia has successfully “cleared the board” in the south, forcing the UAE to pull its remaining special forces out and leaving the dream of an independent South Yemen on life support.

However, this doesn’t mean the UAE is giving up on its long-term goals. While they’ve lost their main political proxy on the mainland, they still have a significant “maritime footprint” on strategic islands like Socotra and Mayyun Island, which sit right at the mouth of the Red Sea. The UAE’s strategy has always been about “nodes, not nations”, controlling the specific ports and waterways that manage global trade. Even with the STC gone, the competition between Saudi “stabilization” and Emirati “fragmentation” is expected to be the main factor that either brings a final peace to Yemen or keeps it stuck in a cycle of proxy battles.

While the drama in Yemen has been the loudest part of the split, Sudan is where the Saudi-UAE rivalry has turned into a truly messy, high-stakes proxy war. By early 2026, the two countries are essentially backing opposite sides in a conflict that has flattened much of Khartoum and triggered a massive humanitarian crisis. It’s a perfect example of their “frenemy” dynamic: on paper, they both want peace and stability in Sudan, but on the ground, they’re funding and arming the very people making sure that doesn’t happen.

Saudi Arabia has thrown its weight behind General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). For Riyadh, this is all about “legitimacy” and state-to-state relations. They view the SAF as the only institution capable of keeping Sudan from totally disintegrating, which is a major priority since a collapsed Sudan would mean a chaotic Red Sea coastline right across from Saudi Arabia’s new luxury tourism projects. To back this up, Riyadh has reportedly been brokering defense deals, like getting Pakistani fighter jets to the SAF, to make sure the regular army stays in the fight.

On the other side, the UAE is widely accused of being the primary support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the paramilitary group led by the notorious “Hemedti.” Even though Abu Dhabi officially denies it, intelligence reports suggest a constant flow of weapons and cash reaching the RSF through networks in Libya and Chad. For the UAE, Hemedti is a useful “anti-Islamist” force who helps them secure their economic interests, like the massive gold trade and future agricultural projects. They see the regular army as being too cozy with the old Muslim Brotherhood-linked regime, which is a massive “no-go” for the UAE’s brand of politics.

This split has basically paralyzed any chance of a peace deal. The “Quad” (the US, UK, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) still holds meetings to talk about a ceasefire, but it’s hard to take them seriously when the two Arab members are effectively fueling the fire. Egypt has jumped into the mix too, siding firmly with Saudi Arabia and the SAF, creating a new “Cairo-Riyadh” axis that’s trying to block Emirati influence at every turn. It’s turned Sudan into a tragic “influence auction,” where the country’s future is being decided by two Gulf neighbors who are more worried about their own regional standing than the actual people living through the war.